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Abstract
Low-pay work has been increasing in prevalence in many industrial countries.
Following standard wage/price-setting theory, this increase should reduce structural
unemployment, because labour market ﬂexibility increases and labour costs decrease.
However, a Keynesian perspective challenges this claim, if the associated increase in
investment demand does not suﬃciently compensate for the negative eﬀects on con-
sumption. This research empirically investigates the theoretically uncertain impact
of the relationship between the extensiveness of the low-pay sector and structural
unemployment. Data from Germany, where the expansion of the low-pay sector has
been declared the goal of the labour market policy, during the period from 1991
to 2008, indicate a positive impact of the growing low-wage sector on structural
unemployment. Moreover, some indications suggest an opposite direction of causal-
ity, such that changes in the level of structural unemployment aﬀect the share of
low-wage earners. This eﬀect is asymmetrical with respect to positive and negative
changes, which seems to reﬂect downward wage rigidity, as caused by labour market
institutions.
NAIRU; low-wage; asymmetric error correction; cointegration; VECM
JEL Classiﬁcations: C32, E24, J31
1 Introduction
As in many other OECD countries, the German low-wage sector has been growing for
several years, partially as an intended result of labour market reforms. For example, re-
forms enacted in the course of the so-called Hartz legislation are based on the argument
that high levels of long-run unemployment are caused by institutional and structural
factors, such as labour market rigidities and an overly even wage structure. Krugman
(1994) argues that low levels of unemployment are permanently possible, at least at the
price of higher wage inequality: The comparison to Anglo-Saxon economies shows that
1inequality and unemployment ‘are two sides of the same coin’. According to this hy-
pothesis and standard wage/price-setting theory, an expanding low-wage sector should
reduce structural unemployment, because it creates additional labour demand by de-
creasing labour costs, especially with respect to less-skilled work. Furthermore, it in-
creases labour market ﬂexibility, in that low-pay jobs tend to be related to ﬁxed-term,
marginal or temporary relationships, which are usually less rigid than standard labour
contracts (Kalina and Weinkopf (2008)). However, if a growing low-pay sector is accom-
panied by decreases in consumption, it could exert multiplier and accelerator eﬀects and
thereby lead to a downturn in aggregate demand. Such demand drops likely inﬂuence
the supply side, with negative eﬀects on employment. Obviously, the expected impact
of an expanding low-wage sector on structural unemployment thus is not clear-cut; the
anticipated outcome depends mainly on the theoretical approach chosen. To attempt to
resolve this question, we investigate the relationship between both variables empirically.
In this approach, our research relates to literature on the impact of institutions on
(structural) unemployment (e.g. Bassanini and Duval (2006); Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000); Gianella et al (2008); Nickell et al (2005)). Prior research has tested several
structural and institutional variables, such as productivity, terms of trade, interest rates,
unemployment beneﬁts, tax wedges, employment protection legislation, union coverage,
or expenditures on active labour market policies. We contribute to this strand of liter-
ature, because the low-pay sector variable has not yet been considered in this context,
though it reﬂects institutional factors and thus labour market ﬂexibility. In Germany,
two institutional factors have been contributing to the expansion of low-pay work. First,
the German system of industrial relations has changed. Union coverage declined, be-
cause the number of companies belonging to employers’ associations decreased, as did
the share of employees with union membership. Thus, the number of collective agree-
ments declared generally binding has decreased (Bosch and Kalina (2008)). Second, the
labour market has been deregulated (Carlin and Soskice (2009)), which has encouraged
more part-time, ﬁxed-term, marginal, and temporary employment, as well as tightened
sanctions for unemployed workers who reject job oﬀers (Kommission (2002)).1
The relationship between low-pay work and unemployment has been recently ad-
dressed. Garz (2010) uses single-equation results to indicate a slightly positive impact
of the extent of the low-wage sector on structural unemployment. We extend that study
by allowing for interdependencies among the variables; speciﬁcally, we employ a vector
error correction model (VECM) and do not rule out the reverse direction of causality a
priori. In addition, we estimate an asymmetric error correction model (AECM), because
the study variables may react to positive and negative shocks in non-linear ways. Eco-
nomic policy and (labour market) regulation may exert positive changes in the variables
that have diﬀerent magnitudes than the negative changes.
1The extent of the low-wage sector captures the share of employees at the lower part of the wage
distribution. In addition to institutional factors, the low-wage variable is therefore aﬀected by factors
that generally inﬂuence the degree of wage inequality (e.g. skill-biased shifts in labour supply due to
educational expansion and migration movements, increased female labour force participation rates [Bosch
and Kalina (2008)], skill-biased technological change [Krueger (1993); Acemoglu (1999)], and the eﬀects
of global trade liberalisation [Freeman (1995); Fitzenberger (1999)]).
2In the next section, we elaborate on the theoretical background for our study. There-
after, we explain our econometric strategy and describe the data. We present and discuss
the results from the VECM and AECM estimations before we conclude with some im-
plications in the last section.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Standard wage/price-setting theory
Structural unemployment is an inherently unobserved variable. In standard wage/price-
setting theory, it is deﬁned as the unemployment rate that prevails when the price-
and wage-setting functions are in equilibrium—often referred to as the non-accelerating
inﬂation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). In equilibrium then, all wage and price ex-
pectations are fulﬁlled, and temporary shocks are absent. The theoretical impact of
the extent of the low-wage sector on the NAIRU can be evaluated according to price-
and wage-setting processes. For example Layard et al (1991) (361-396) propose setting
prices under incomplete competition as a constant mark-up over labour costs. Inter
alia, labour costs are aﬀected by short- and long-run supply-side factors, such as oil or
import price shocks, capital costs and the intensity of competition. Wage setting then is
an outcome of the collective bargaining process, which depends on short- and long-run
factors that inﬂuence bargaining power, such as changes in the trade balance, unemploy-
ment beneﬁts or union coverage. In this regard, the extent of the low-wage sector does
not aﬀect price directly but rather inﬂuences wage setting. An growing low-pay sector
implies a reduction in real labour costs and thus increases labour demand, whereas a
decreasing low-wage sector has the opposite eﬀect. These changes relate to long-run
institutional or structural factors that determine labour demand and supply in the lower
wage distribution.
The long-run path of the NAIRU only depends on institutional and structural factors
though, because price and wage surprises and temporary shocks merely aﬀect the Phillips
curve trade oﬀ, which is assumed to exist only in the short run. A lasting low-wage
expansion leads to a decline in the NAIRU, as we depict in Figure 1. Due to reduced
real labour costs, the wage-setting curve (WSC) shifts to the right, whereas the price-
setting curve (PSC) remains unchanged. The economy moves from point A to its new
equilibrium B. If the PSC is downward sloping, as in the graph, real wages fall from w*
to w1*. More important though, the NAIRU decreases from u* to u1*.
2.2 Keynesian demand eﬀects
The demand side of the economy plays only a passive role in the NAIRU model. That
is, employment appears determined only by the supply side, and aggregate demand
simply adjusts to a certain employment equilibrium. The NAIRU then is exogenous
with respect to the demand side. Institutional factors—in this context, the extent of the
low-pay sector—are supposed to aﬀect the long-run position of the NAIRU only through










Figure 1: Low-wage expansion and the NAIRU
unemployment. However, both theoretical and empirical issues challenge this notion.
From a Keynesian point of view, employment is determined by aggregate supply and
demand outcomes in goods markets. Thus, malfunctions in the labour market explain
only a small fraction of total unemployment. Empirical studies support this argument,
as summarised by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000): ‘labour market institutions do not
appear to explain the general evolution of unemployment over time.’
Some authors have incorporated features that allow the NAIRU to be endogenously
determined by demand factors. For example, some models account for hysteresis eﬀects,
which would imply permanent eﬀects of shocks on employment through the demand side,
such as those caused by a restrictive monetary policy (Ball (1997), Ball (1999)). Others
have emphasised the role of capital accumulation (Blanchard et al (1997); Arestis et al
(2007); Stockhammer and Klaer (2011)). Capital accumulation may aﬀect employment
through two channels: First, low investment demand, ampliﬁed by a standard multiplier
mechanism, results in low aggregate production and unemployment. This scenario may
exert hysteresis eﬀects on the labour market and permanently lower capital stock accu-
mulation, which initiates—through the mechanism of poor proﬁtability expectations—a
self-energising period of low investment. Second, Rowthorn (1999) has shown that even
in the NAIRU framework, capital accumulation aﬀects employment if the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour is less than 1. In this case, an increase in capital
is accompanied by an increase in the share of labour.
Because the extent of the low-wage sector aﬀects the level of real wages (i.e. a high
share of low-wage earners implies a lower real-wage level than does a low share, ceteris
paribus), the relationship between the level of real wages and aggregate demand is cru-
cial for evaluating the theoretical eﬀect of an expanding low-wage sector on (structural)
unemployment. In a framework where employment is determined by goods rather than
the labour market, wages have a cost as well as a demand eﬀect (Bhaduri and Marglin
4(1990)). The overall eﬀect then depends on the prevailing goods market regime.2 In a
proﬁt-led regime, an expanding low-wage sector results in lower real unit labour costs.
The negative impact on consumption due to lower wage income is more than compen-
sated for by higher investment demand, which leads to an overall increase in aggregate
demand and production, as well as in employment. In contrast, if the prevailing regime
is wage-led, investment demand is inelastic with respect to changes in real wages. If the
increase in investment demand is not suﬃciently high to compensate for the negative
consumption eﬀect, it results in less aggregate demand, production and employment.3
Thus, the impact of a low-wage expansion depends on the goods market regime.
3 Econometric strategy
3.1 The vector error correction model
Both theoretical approaches acknowledge that the extent of the low-pay sector can
causally inﬂuence the level of structural unemployment. To test whether there are
repercussions from structural unemployment to the low-pay sector, we allow for inter-
dependencies and employ a VECM. The structural form for the determination of the
m × 1 vector of variables zt is given by:
A∆zt = ˜ a +˜ bt − ˜ Πzt−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
˜ Γi∆zt−i + ǫt   (1)
Matrix A contains contemporaneous structural coeﬃcients, whereas ˜ Π and ˜ Γ contain
dynamic coeﬃcients that relate ∆zt to past values of zt. All matrices are of size m × m,
whereas ˜ a and ˜ b are m × 1 vectors of structural coeﬃcients. The m × 1 vector of
structural disturbances ǫt is serially uncorrelated with zero means and a positive deﬁnite
variance covariance matrix, Ω.
If there are 0 < r < m cointegrating vectors, then β will be an m × r matrix, and ˜ Π
will be of rank r:
˜ Π = ˜ αβ′   (2)
where the linear combination β′zt is I(0) and refers to the deviation from equilibrium,
such that the matrix ˜ α (m × r) captures the adjustment coeﬃcients. Pre-multiplying
equation (1) by A−1 yields the reduced form VECM:
∆zt = a + bt − Πzt−1 +
p−1 X
i=1
Γi∆zt−i + vt   (3)
2Bowles and Boyer (1995) ﬁnd evidence that the German economy follows a proﬁt-led demand regime,
whereas Naastepad and Storm (2007) and Hein and Vogel (2008) ﬁnd evidence for a wage-led one.
3Carlin and Soskice (2009) argue that an increase in labour market ﬂexibility strengthens households’
precautionary savings motive ‘in response to the concerns about cutbacks in the welfare state generated
by government policy’, which could amplify the negative income eﬀect.
5where a = A−1˜ a, b = A−1˜ b, and Γi = A−1 ˜ Γi. In addition, Π = A−1˜ Π = A−1˜ αβ′ = αβ′,
where α = A−1˜ α and vt = A−1ǫt are the reduced-form errors. The corresponding
variance covariance matrix is Σ, with Ω = AΣA′ (Garratt et al (2006)).
3.2 The asymmetric error correction model
The standard VECM assumes that a response of a variable to an impulse from an-
other variable is symmetric: Negative changes should have the same magnitude as pos-
itive ones. In contrast, the AECM is not restricted to this assumption but allows for
asymmetric responses. We start with the following asymmetric (cointegrating) long-run
regression (for details, see Shin et al (2009)):
yt = β+′x+
t + β+′x−
t + ut   (4)
where yt, x+
t and x−
t are I(1) variables, and the last two series are the positive and


















min(∆xj 0)   (6)
The coeﬃcients β+ and β− refer to the asymmetric long-run impacts. Equation (4) can
be rewritten as an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) representation and further
transformed into the AECM:












t−j) + ǫt   (7)
The asymmetric long-run coeﬃcients are computed as c β+ = −c θ+ b ρ and c β− = −c θ− b ρ.
Equation (7) then can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). In this context,
we are particularly interested in the following tests:
• A long-run level relationship between the variables. We apply the bounds-testing
approach proposed by Pesaran et al (2001) (PSS) and Shin et al (2009), to test the
null hypothesis of no level relationship between the variables versus the existence
of such a long-run relationship, using the PSS F-statistics:
H0:ρ = θ+ = θ− = 0  
where ρ, θ+ and θ− are the relevant coeﬃcients in equation (7).
6• Long-run symmetry. We test the null hypothesis of unity for the long-run pa-
rameters, β+ and β−, against the alternative hypothesis of diversity, using Wald
statistics:4
H0:β+ = β−  
4 Data
Because structural unemployment is not observable, we use the Kalman ﬁltered unem-
ployment rate (time-varying NAIRU) as a proxy. The extent of the low-wage sector
(LWS) is calculated with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version
2008, of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). We provide the details of
the NAIRU estimation and the calculation of the low-pay extent in the Appendix.5 As
control variables, we use the real interest rate (RLTIR), the vacancy ratio (VACRATIO)
and the log of the oil price (OILPRICE). The real interest rate refers to the nomi-
nal long-term interest rate deﬂated by the gross domestic product (GDP) deﬂator; it
provides a proxy for monetary factors that aﬀect the economy. The vacancy ratio is de-
ﬁned as the ratio of vacancies to the number of unemployed, which indicates mismatch
unemployment. The oil price aims to capture exogenous, unexpected supply shocks.6
We restrict our choice of controls to these three variables to keep the identiﬁcation of
our econometric models feasible. All data are available from at least 1984Q3 to 2008Q4.
However, stability issues related to the time before German reuniﬁcation in some models
prompted us to restrict the analysis to the period from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4.
We plot the data in Figure 2. After the reuniﬁcation shock, the NAIRU initially
tended to increase, from about 8.9% to 9.3% in 1998, at which point it began falling
to its lowest post-reuniﬁcation value of about 8.8%. Thereafter, the NAIRU rose again
until it reached its peak of approximately 9.7% in 2005, then began another decline. The
second time-series of primary interest, the extent of the low-wage sector, has its lowest
values in the years immediately following German reuniﬁcation. From 1995 onward, it
has shown a clear upward trend, implying an increase of low-wage earners from about
16% in 1995 to 22% in 2006. The visual inspection of the data thus oﬀers a ﬁrst indi-
cation that the relationship between the variables may not be negative as predicted by
standard wage/price-setting theory but rather should be characterised as ambiguous, if
not positive.
4We also allow for short-run asymmetry but do not test it explicitly.
5We do not attempt to incorporate the low-wage extent or other institutional variables already in
the Kalman ﬁlter procedure. When applying the ﬁlter, the NAIRU is treated as a variable, determined
solely stochastically on the basis of actual unemployment in a Phillips curve context. The stochastic
process is assumed to capture all inﬂuences aﬀecting the NAIRU, so an omitted variable bias cannot
occur.
6The data for the vacancy ratio and the real interest rate are seasonally adjusted and provided by
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Figure 2: Time-series plots of the data
8Before we conduct our cointegration analysis, we evaluated the order of integration
of each time-series. The insight from usual stationarity tests is ambiguous (see Tables
5 and 6 in Appendix for details): The ADF-GLS test suggests that the vacancy ratio
might be I(0) and the low-wage share and the oil price even I(2). In contrast, the KPSS
test suggests that all variables are I(1), even if the null hypothesis of stationarity in the
level of the vacancy ratio can only be rejected at the 10% level. Given the lack of power
of stationarity tests and considering our small sample size, we assume all variables to be
I(1).
5 Results
5.1 Vector error correction estimates
We estimate four models. The ﬁrst comprises the following variables: low-wage share,
NAIRU, real interest rate and vacancy ratio. Models 2, 3 and 3R also incorporate an
unrestricted impulse dummy, which takes a value of 1 at date 2001Q1 and 0 at other
times to account for an outlier. Model 3 includes the oil price as a weakly exogenous7 I(1)
series, as well as its changes as unrestricted variables. In model 3R (restricted model
3), we test the hypothesis that the NAIRU does not enter the long-run equilibrium
relationship by setting the corresponding alpha and beta coeﬃcients to 0.
According to diﬀerent information criteria, a VECM(5) is appropriate for all three
models, irrespective of the deterministics (i.e. with constant, with constant and trend,
with and without dummy variables and the level of the oil price). Johansen trace tests
suggest, for each of the three models, one long-run level relationship (see Tables 7 and
8).
Accordingly, we estimate the four VECMs with unrestricted intercepts and normalise
the low-wage share to the unit level.8 The estimation and corresponding test results are
summarised in Table 1. The ﬁt of the LWS and NAIRU equations are much better when
the impulse dummy is included; the values increase from 0.29 to 0.56 and from 0.10 to
0.48, respectively. None of the models suﬀer from serial correlation or ARCH eﬀects.
Including the contemporary and one-period lagged ﬁrst diﬀerence (further lags are not
signiﬁcant) of the oil price in the short-run dynamics results in normally distributed
residuals for models 3 and 3R. The oil price thus seems to compensate for supply shocks
hitting the economy.
The real interest rate is always signiﬁcant, and its coeﬃcient remains stable for
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The vacancy ratio becomes signiﬁcant after correcting for an
outlier in the short-run dynamics. Its coeﬃcient also remains more or less stable for
models 2, 3 and 3R. In the ﬁrst two models, the NAIRU enters the long-run relationship
signiﬁcantly, with a rather high coeﬃcient between -3.7 and -4.3. However, including
the oil price leads to an insigniﬁcant NAIRU coeﬃcient. In model 3R, we therefore
7It is plausible to assume that the oil price is not aﬀected by economic conditions in Germany.
8We also attempt to normalise the NAIRU series, but as the adjustment coeﬃcient for this equation
is not signiﬁcantly negative, it would lead to a misspeciﬁcation.
9Table 1: VECM estimation results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3R
T = 67 T = 67 T = 67 T = 67
Beta
RLTIR 0.784 (0.182) 0.888 (0.198) 0.829 (0.153) 0.819 (0.113)
VACRATIO 0.120 (0.092) 0.228 (0.099) 0.314 (0.109) 0.300 (0.051)
LWS 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000)
NAIRU -4.385 (1.899) -3.793 (2.080) 0.107 (2.020) 0.000 (0.000)
OILPRICE - - -1.320 (0.466) -1.290 (0.347)
Alpha
RLTIR -0.050 (0.029) -0.043 (0.025) -0.044 (0.033) -0.045 (0.033)
VACRATIO -0.300 (0.067) -0.236 (0.058) -0.363 (0.079) -0.357 (0.074)
LWS -0.130 (0.041) -0.141 (0.028) -0.186 (0.040) -0.193 (0.039)
NAIRU 0.010 (0.011) 0.004 (0.007) 0.005 (0.010) 0.000 (0.000)
Eq.1/Eq.2/Eq.3/Eq.4 Eq.1/Eq.2/Eq.3/Eq.4 Eq.1/Eq.2/Eq.3/Eq.4 Eq.1/Eq.2/Eq.3/Eq.4
Adj. R2 0.28/0.57/0.29/0.10 0.28/0.59/0.56/0.48 0.34/0.60/0.53/0.46 0.36/0.61/0.54/0.47
SC(2), p-value 0.99/0.24/0.78/0.83 0.81/0.28/0.11/0.22 0.94/0.58/0.22/0.26 0.94/0.58/0.24/0.26
SC(4), p-value 0.99/0.46/0.36/0.98 0.96/0.50/0.22/0.47 0.99/0.75/0.40/0.51 0.99/0.76/0.43/0.47
ARCH(2), p-value 0.30/0.90/0.67/0.77 0.29/0.56/0.26/0.59 0.28/0.52/0.26/0.58 0.28/0.50/0.27/0.51
ARCH(4), p-value 0.38/0.99/0.93/0.74 0.24/0.88/0.61/0.62 0.41/0.73/0.51/0.67 0.41/0.73/0.52/0.62
NORM, p-value 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.39
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. SC(p), ARCH(p) and NORM refer, respectively, to the Ljung-Box
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Figure 3: Impulse-response functions of NAIRU to a shock in LWS
estimate a restricted VECM. We cannot reject the null hypotheses that the NAIRU
does not adjust to pre-period, long-run disequilibrium and that it does not enter the
long-run relationship (beta[NAIRU] = 0, alpha[NAIRU] = 0, LR test p-value = 0.855).
We suppose that the oil price accounts for some structural factors aﬀecting the economy,
which the NAIRU does not fully explain; the cost factor information contained in the
oil price seems to dominate the structural issues reﬂected by the NAIRU.
As a next step, we compute the impulse-response functions for 36 periods to describe
the response of the low-wage share to a NAIRU shock, and vice versa. We use an 84%
conﬁdence interval, on the basis of 999 bootstrap replications.9 The contemporaneous
(causal) recursive Cholesky ordering is as follows: real interest rate → vacancy ratio →
low-wage share → NAIRU. That is, we assume that the real interest rate aﬀects aggregate
demand and supply conditions, which leads to a reconsideration of employment demand
and therefore changes in the vacancy ratio. This shift aﬀects the low-wage extent through
the employment ratio between low-wage and non-low-wage workers. Finally, we assume
the NAIRU takes the last position, because it is aﬀected by several channels, as we
discussed in Section 2. However, the impulse-response functions are robust to alternative
orderings of these variables.
9With our small sample, we assume that the uncertainty of the estimates is relatively high. Therefore,
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Figure 4: Impulse-response functions of LWS to a shock in NAIRU
Figure 3 depicts the impulse responses of the NAIRU to a positive shock in the low-
wage share. For all four models, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive response after around two
years, in line with the ﬁndings of Garz (2010). Thus, the presumption that an increase
in the low-wage extent results in a lower NAIRU, as in standard wage/price-setting
theory, is strongly rejected. Instead, the results from this symmetric approach favour
the Keynesian argument.
We depict the impulse-response functions for the reverse direction in Figure 4. None
of the four models indicates a signiﬁcant impact of a NAIRU shock on the low-wage
share. The initial response of the point estimator tends to be positive for models 1
and 2 and approximately 0 for models 3 and 3R. In the medium to long run, the point
estimator of model 1 remains positive, approximately 0 for model 2 and negative after
the inclusion of the oil price (model 3) or the imposed restriction on the NAIRU (model
3R). Thus, the eﬀect of an unexpected NAIRU change on the extent of the low-wage
sector remains ambiguous.
5.2 Asymmetric error correction estimates
We employ the same variables we used for the VECM estimation. Because the asymmet-
ric approach is limited to a single-equation representation, we estimate both directions,
ﬁrst assuming that the low-wage share, and then the NAIRU, is endogenous:
1. LWS = f(NAIRU, RLTIR, VACRATIO, OILPRICE),
122. NAIRU = f(LWS, RLTIR, VACRATIO, OILPRICE).
For each direction, we estimate three diﬀerent speciﬁcations. First, we start by
estimating the pure model. Second, we add impulse dummies to account for outliers.
Third, we add the level of the oil price, as well as its contemporaneous and lagged ﬁrst
diﬀerences. The maximum lag length for models 1 and 2 is ﬁve, whereas the small sample
size limits model 3 to four lags. We follow a general-to-speciﬁc approach to select the
ﬁnal lag structure by successively dropping all lags insigniﬁcant at the 5% level.
Table 2 shows the long-run estimation results, with low-wage extent as the dependent
variable. For all three speciﬁcations, the PSS F-test and Banerjee et al (1998) BDM t-
test suggest a signiﬁcant long-run relationship. The ﬁt of the models is remarkably high,
with the lowest (adjusted) R2 value around 0.67. Our battery of tests indicates some
potential serial correlation for models 1 and 3 (the null hypothesis can only be rejected
at the 5% level), some potential model misspeciﬁcation for model 1 (RESET test) and
some ARCH eﬀects for model 3. The latter model also seems to be subject to parameter
instability, as suggested by the QLR test around 1998Q2.
The estimated coeﬃcients indicate that decreasing structural unemployment (i.e.
increase in the NAIRU(-) variable) is accompanied by a smaller low-wage extent. In
turn, increasing structural unemployment (i.e. NAIRU(+) increase) leads to a higher
low-wage share. The estimated coeﬃcient for the NAIRU(+) series is only signiﬁcant in
models 2 and 3. In contrast, the NAIRU(-) coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst
two models but slightly above 10% when we include the oil price. Two explanations
could indicate why structural unemployment aﬀects the low-wage sector as these esti-
mates suggest. First, German labour market reforms, which contributed to the low-pay
expansion, are clearly reactions to the high, long-lasting levels of unemployment. Sec-
ond, a lower NAIRU likely increases the bargaining power of workers at the lower end
of the wage distribution. These workers are usually less qualiﬁed, which allows ﬁrms to
replace them easily. However, their disadvantageous bargaining position improves when
unemployment decreases and more jobs become available. If they are able to bargain for
higher real wages, some workers may exit the low-pay sector. In contrast, an increase
in structural unemployment reduces the bargaining power of low-wage employees, which
causes the low-pay sector to grow instead. Labour market institutions probably induce
an asymmetric form in this eﬀect, as the coeﬃcients and the bootstrapped Wald test
indicate. The lower absolute magnitude of the NAIRU(+) coeﬃcient seems to reﬂect
downward wage rigidity, caused by labour market regulation (e.g. employment pro-
tection legislation, minimum and combination wages) and unions, which jointly work
to combat increasing inequality when structural downturns appear. In contrast, these
institutions do not impede the reduction of wage inequality if employment rises perma-
nently. This asymmetry can be visualised according to the dynamic multipliers in Figure
5 (panels a, c and e). These graphs also indicate that the shock reaction reaches its peak
after a few periods and remains stable in the medium and long runs.
Table 3 depicts the other case, with the NAIRU as the dependent variable. For all
three speciﬁcations, the PSS F-test suggests at least one long-run relationship. The
BDM t-test indicates a cointegration relationship for models 1 and 3 but not for model
13Table 2: AECM estimation results (dependent variable: d LWS)
Model 1, T = 66 Model 2, T = 66 Model 3, T = 67
Coeﬃcient (p-val.) Coeﬃcient (p-val.) Coeﬃcient (p-val.)
L RLTIR(+) -0.086 (0.762) -0.062 (0.799) -0.368 (0.413)
L RLTIR(-) -0.253 (0.029) -0.186 (0.091) -0.141 (0.634)
L VACRATIO(+) -0.260 (0.000) -0.259 (0.000) -0.242 (0.010)
L VACRATIO(-) -0.107 (0.060) -0.078 (0.165) -0.190 (0.121)
L NAIRU(+) 0.852 (0.154) 1.560 (0.008) 1.906 (0.089)
L NAIRU(-) -1.827 (0.025) -1.723 (0.038) -2.573 (0.111)
L OILPRICE(+) -0.312 (0.704)
L OILPRICE(-) 0.242 (0.825)
Wsym RLTIR, p-value 0.452 0.536 0.574
Wsym VACRATIO, p-value 0.090 0.040 0.779
Wsym NAIRU, p-value 0.015 0.003 0.046
Wsym OILPRICE, p-value 0.709
Adj. R2 0.713 0.699 0.674
SC(4), p-value 0.094 0.207 0.087
ARCH(4), p-value 0.819 0.123 0.062
NORM, p-value 0.734 0.367 0.945
RESET, p-value 0.080 0.141 0.224
CUSUM, p-value 0.643 0.578 0.490
QLR, p-value (break date) >10% (2003Q3) >10% (2003Q3) <5% (1998Q2)
BDM, t-stat (t-crit 1/5/10%) -10.11 (-4.99/-4.38/-4.04) -9.17 (-4.99/-4.38/-4.04) -5.53 (-5.37/-4.72/-4.40)
PSS, F-stat (F-crit 1/5/10%) 20.17 (4.43/3.61/3.23) 13.90 (4.43/3.61/3.23) 8.37 (4.10/3.39/3.06)
Notes: (+) and (-) denote positive and negative partial sum processes, respectively. Wsym * refers to the boot-
strapped Wald test statistic for long-run symmetry. SC(4), ARCH(4), NORM, RESET, CUSUM and QLR denote,
respectively, the tests for serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey, F-statistic), ARCH eﬀects (χ2(4)), normality (χ2),
functional form (Ramsey’s RESET, F-statistic), parameter stability (Harvey-Collier test statistics) and a struc-
tural break at an unknown point (15% trimming). BDM refers to the cointegration test suggested by Banerjee
et al (1998), which provides t-statistics and corresponding critical values. PSS denotes the F-statistic and critical
values for the bounds testing approach proposed by Pesaran et al (2001).
142. The ﬁt of the ﬁrst model is relatively low (adjusted R2 = 0.346). It is not lower
than the (adjusted) R2 = 0.738 for the other two models, which is probably due to the
inclusion of impulse dummies and the oil price. For model 1, the tests indicate some
misspeciﬁcation, potential ARCH eﬀects and a structural break in 2005Q1. For model
3, we also ﬁnd some evidence for a structural break in 2004Q4.
The LWS(+) coeﬃcient, which measures the impact of a growing low-pay sector, is
only signiﬁcant in model 1, which indicates a positive impact on the NAIRU, in line
with the VECM. In model 2, the LWS(+) coeﬃcient is negative but not signiﬁcant.
Model 3 again shows the expected positive sign for this coeﬃcient, though it is not
signiﬁcant. The VECM results receive further conﬁrmation from the coeﬃcient estimate
for LWS(-), which is signiﬁcantly negative in model 2 (a shrinking low-pay sector lowers
structural unemployment). In model 1 and 3, the LWS(-) coeﬃcient admittedly has a
positive sign but is not signiﬁcant. However, the VECM results are always conﬁrmed
when the LWS(+) and LWS(-) estimate is signiﬁcant. The null hypothesis of symmetry
cannot be rejected for any of the models, which is probably associated with the broadly
indicated insigniﬁcance of the LWS(+/-) coeﬃcients. For the same reason, the dynamic
multipliers in Figure 5 (panels b, d and f) are diﬃcult to interpret. They indicate a
NAIRU response that is either positive or negative, irrespective of whether it is caused
by a LWS(+) or LWS(-) shock.
6 Conclusion
Based on quarterly data from 1991Q1 to 2008Q4, we investigate the relationship between
structural unemployment and the extent of the low-wage sector in Germany. Controlling
for other structural and institutional inﬂuences, we conclude from the VECM that the
causality in this context runs from the extent of the low-pay sector to structural unem-
ployment. But contrary to standard wage/price-setting theory, the relationship is not
negative. Instead, an increasing share of low-wage earners raises structural unemploy-
ment. The ﬁnding corresponds to the Keynesian perspective that a growing low-wage
sector lowers consumption, which is not fully compensated for by reduced labour costs
and the associated increase in investment demand. The resulting reduction of aggregate
demand ﬁnally leads to higher structural unemployment. If they have any related ef-
fect, the creation of low-wage jobs therefore might contribute to reduce cyclical, but not
structural, unemployment. This is problematic, because the German low-wage sector
has been growing steadily since 1995 and is presumably expanding further as intended
by labour market policy. The result of this study also implies that the hoped-for eﬀect of
getting people into stable, long-term employment through their initial experience with
ﬂexible relationships (the ‘stepping stone’ eﬀect) does not seem very likely.
With the AECM we do not ﬁnd one-sided causality, but we identify some reverse ef-
fects. Changes in structural unemployment have repercussions for the share of low-wage
earners, because they inﬂuence the bargaining power of less qualiﬁed and easily replace-
able workers. The AECM also indicates asymmetry in this eﬀect. That is, institutions
such as labour market regulations, unions and collective bargaining have a preserving
15Table 3: AECM estimation results (dependent variable: d NAIRU)
Model 1, T = 66 Model 2, T = 66 Model 3, T = 66
Coeﬃcient (p-val.) Coeﬃcient (p-val.) Coeﬃcient (p-val.)
L RLTIR(+) -0.128 (0.037) -0.103 (0.039) 0.082 (0.299)
L RLTIR(-) 0.014 (0.661) -0.002 (0.175) -0.208 (0.003)
L VACRATIO(+) -0.043 (0.000) -0.117 (0.978) -0.024 (0.176)
L VACRATIO(-) -0.060 (0.000) 0.009 (0.001) -0.058 (0.008)
L LWS(+) 0.095 (0.039) -0.371 (0.775) 0.023 (0.618)
L LWS(-) 0.017 (0.722) -0.318 (0.000) 0.058 (0.308)
L OILPRICE(+) -0.294 (0.112)
L OILPRICE(-) 0.982 (0.001)
Trend 0.036 (0.038)
Wsym RLTIR, p-value 0.048 0.454 0.007
Wsym VACRATIO, p-value 0.320 0.017 0.325
Wsym LWS, p-value 0.232 0.483 0.613
Wsym OILPRICE, p-value 0.000
Adj. R2 0.346 0.738 0.835
SC(4), p-value 0.950 0.885 0.631
ARCH(4), p-value 0.094 0.725 0.361
NORM, p-value 0.002 0.432 0.637
RESET, p-value 0.001 0.554 0.930
CUSUM, p-value 0.714 0.713 0.943
QLR, p-value (break date) <1% (2005Q1) >10% (1998Q2) <5% (2004Q4)
BDM, t-stat (t-crit 1/5/10%) -5.78 (-4.99/-4.38/-4.04) -4.46 (-5.65/-5.01/-4.68) -5.04 (-5.37/-4.72/-4.40)
PSS, F-stat (F-crit 1/5/10%) 5.36 (4.43/3.61/3.23) 7.04 (4.90/4.00/3.59) 7.18 (4.10/3.39/3.06)
Notes: (+) and (-) denote positive and negative partial sum processes, respectively. Wsym * refers to the
bootstrapped Wald test statistic for long-run symmetry. SC(4), ARCH(4), NORM, RESET, CUSUM and QLR
denote, respectively, the tests for serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey, F-statistic), ARCH eﬀects (χ2(4)), nor-
mality (χ2), functional form (Ramsey’s RESET, F-statistic), parameter stability (Harvey-Collier test statistics)
and a structural break at an unknown point (15% trimming). BDM refers to the cointegration test suggested by
Banerjee et al (1998), which provides t-statistics and corresponding critical values. PSS denotes the F-statistic
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Figure 5: Dynamic multipliers
17eﬀect on wage equality in periods of structural downturns, but they do not interfere
when the labour market tightens.
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21A Estimation of the NAIRU
This section brieﬂy describes the NAIRU estimation, as presented by Garz (2010), based
on a theoretical derivation from the wage/price-setting system discussed by Layard et al
(1991) and Turner et al (2001). The NAIRU is estimated in a state space system, where
the observation equation represents the Phillips curve:
∆πt = α(L)∆πt−1 + β(L)Gapt + γ(L)Pimt + δDt + επ
t   (8)
The inﬂation rate is denoted as πt, where ∆ indicates the ﬁrst diﬀerence. Lagged values
of the change of inﬂation are allowed to enter as explanatory variables. Gapt represents
the unemployment gap, and Pimt is the import price index. To capture German reuni-
ﬁcation and some other outliers, the vector Dt contains several dummy variables. The
error term επ
t is assumed to be independently and normally distributed. The observation
equation is complemented by the deﬁnition of the unemployment rate as the sum of the
unemployment gap and the NAIRU:
Ut = Gapt + NAIRUt   (9)
The stochastic properties of the unemployment gap and the NAIRU are described by
the following state equations:
Gapt = ar1Gapt−1 + ar2Gapt−2 + ε
Gap
t   (10)
NAIRUt = NAIRUt−1 + θI91q1 t + εNAIRU
t   (11)
In equation (10), the unemployment gap is modelled as an AR(2) process. With the
condition |ar1 + ar2| < 1, the cyclical component of unemployment is a stationary,
autocorrelated process with a sample mean of 0. In the second state equation, the
NAIRU is deﬁned as a random walk without drift. The impulse dummy I91q1 t is included
to account for the reuniﬁcation break. The error terms of both state equations are
assumed to be normally distributed and mutually uncorrelated.
This state space set-up is similar to the speciﬁcations provided by Laubach (2001),
Logeay and Tober (2006), Stephanides (2006), and Turner et al (2001). The attempt to
model the NAIRU as a random walk with drift, as in some of these studies, produces
rather unsatisfactory results (i.e. both the trend term and the trend state are statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant). In addition, the inclusion of a stochastic trend term in the NAIRU
equation characterises the unemployment rate as I(2), which is not supported by unit
root tests.
The data for inﬂation and unemployment come from the OECD. The inﬂation rate
(LOG PINFL) is deﬁned as the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the logarithm of the consumer price
index. The unemployment rate (UREG) is the ratio of registered unemployed persons
to the total civilian labour force. The short-term supply shock variable is the logarithm
of the import price index (LOG PIM). This variable is provided in the International
Financial Statistics database of the IMF. All variables are available on a quarterly basis
22and at least from 1970Q1 to 2009Q4. They either had been seasonally adjusted by
the provider, or we adjusted them using the Census X12 procedure. All series refer to
uniﬁed Germany from 1991Q1 and to West Germany prior to this date. In accordance
with ADF unit root tests (available on request), we assume all time series to be I(1).
The Phillips curve variables and their lagged values are chosen on the basis of the
signiﬁcance levels, guided by a preliminary stepwise OLS regression. Starting with the
general model, we remove the most statistically insigniﬁcant variables step by step, until
all remaining variables are at least signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In this context, we substi-
tute the unobservable NAIRU with the HP-ﬁltered unemployment rate. The potential
explanatory variables are eight lags of the dependent variable, the unemployment gap
with four lags, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the unemployment rate, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
import price index with four lags and several impulse dummies to account for German
reuniﬁcation and outliers.
We use the resulting model to specify the Phillips curve equation in the state space
model, as well as to obtain the starting coeﬃcient values for the Kalman ﬁlter.10 The
initial state values we chose equal the ﬁrst observation of the HP-ﬁltered unemployment
rate and the corresponding unemployment gap. The initial variance-covariance matrix
is diagonal, with large, arbitrarily set values. This approach allows the optimisation
process to converge quickly.
Table 4 shows the NAIRU estimation results. It reports the estimated parameters of
the state space system, the standard deviations of the respective error terms and tests
for residual autocorrelation and normality. All estimated coeﬃcients are in accordance
with economic theory. The impulse dummies in the Phillips curve are not signiﬁcant,
which conﬂicts with the preliminary OLS estimate that indicated high signiﬁcance. All
impulse dummies are nonetheless retained in the system, because they contribute to
residual normality. The sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients in the unemployment gap
equation is slightly below 1.11 The Phillips curve residual tests are satisfactory. Neither
null hypothesis, of normally distributed or serially uncorrelated residuals, can be rejected.
The estimated time path of the Kalman smoothed NAIRU is generally similar to those
of previous studies with estimates for Germany (Fitzenberger et al (2008); Logeay and
Tober (2006); SVR (2007); Turner et al (2001)).
To evaluate the robustness of the results, we also estimated the system with diﬀerent
shock variables (oil price, labour productivity and price wedge), an inﬂation rate based
on the GDP deﬂator and an alternative measure of the unemployment rate. A detailed
description of these variables and the results are available on request; the results do not
substantially diﬀer from our proposed speciﬁcation. We also checked the robustness of
10Kalman ﬁlter estimates usually depend on exactly provided initial coeﬃcient values. Tentatively
changing these values shows that the estimation results are sensitive to such changes. In most cases,
inappropriate starting values produce implausible results or prevent the optimisation process from con-
verging. The same outcome applies if variables are added or removed without readjusting the initial
coeﬃcient values.
11If the sum of the autoregressive coeﬃcients were exactly 1, the unemployment gap would not be
stationary. ADF tests on the estimated gap series show that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can
be rejected with a p-value of 0.0040.
23Table 4: NAIRU estimation results
Dependent Variable: πCPI
t
















I91q3 t 0.0116 (0.5605)
I91q4 t 0.0112 (0.3571)







Notes: SC(4) and NORM denote the LM test for
serial correlation (Breusch-Godfrey, F-statistic) and
normality (χ2), respectively. The p-values for the co-
eﬃcients and test statistics are in parentheses.
24our VECMs and AECMs with the alternatively obtained NAIRUs and again did not
ﬁnd any substantial diﬀerences.
B Calculation of the low-wage extent
The data for the calculation of the extent of the low-wage sector are provided by the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 2008, of the German Institute for Eco-
nomic Research (DIW). We include only dependently employed people. Workers older
than 64 years, the usual age of retirement from the labour force in Germany, are re-
moved. The lower age limit is predeﬁned by the SOEP, because its surveys only include
people older than 18 years of age. The extent of the low-wage sector can be calculated
for each year from 1984 to 2008, the time span for which the necessary data are com-
pletely available. The initial period from 1984 to 1994 includes only West Germany and
the time from 1995 to 2008 refers to the reuniﬁed country. For statistical inference, the
data are cross-sectionally weighted.
The OECD deﬁnes a low-wage threshold as two-thirds of the median wage (OECD
(1996)). We adopt this widely used deﬁnition. The reference wage is calculated on both
a net and an hourly basis, which allows for a comparison across employees, regardless
of their individual taxation or working time. The extent of the low-wage sector is then
deﬁned as the share of workers with wages below this threshold among all employees.
Because all other variables in this study are measured on a quarterly basis, we must
disaggregate the resulting low-pay time-series. To do so, we applied the procedure
suggested by Chow and Lin (1971). We checked several instruments12 and decided
to use labour productivity without the manufacturing industry as our auxiliary variable,
because it led to the most plausible result. In addition, we applied an exponential moving
average (current weight = 0.6) to remove some irregular high frequency movements.
C Unit root and cointegration tests
12Labour productivity of the manufacturing industry without the building sector, labour productivity
of the total economy (both from the DESTATIS database of the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce) and
real GDP (Eurostat database of the statistical oﬃce of the European Union).
25Table 5: ADF-GLS tests
Variable T-statistics P-value Deterministic Lag (Max. 6)
NAIRU -1.127 0.237 Constant 1
LWS -1.300 >10% Constant + Trend 4
RLTIR -2.066 >10% Constant + Trend 1
VACRATIO -1.869 0.059 Constant 5
OILPROCE -0.943 >10% Constant + Trend 5
d NAIRU -11.505 0.000 Constant 0
d LWS -0.917 0.319 Constant 6
d RLTIR -2.409 0.015 Constant 2
d VACRATIO -1.997 0.044 Constant 4
d OILPRICE -1.367 0.160 Constant 6
Notes: The initial maximum lag length is 6, and the actual lag order is ob-
tained by testing down as follows: estimating the Dickey-Fuller regression
with k lags of the dependent variables; if the last lag is signiﬁcant, executing
the test with order k, otherwise, let k = k − 1. If case the test with linear
trends using GLS p-values is not applicable, critical values from Elliott et
al (1996), Table 1, are included instead.
Table 6: KPSS tests
Variable T-statistics P-value Deterministic
NAIRU 0.697 0.015 Constant
LWS 0.170 0.037 Constant + Trend
RLTIR 0.279 <1% Constant + Trend
VACRATIO 0.361 0.096 Constant
OILPROCE 0.371 <1% Constant + Trend
d NAIRU 0.235 >10% Constant
d LWS 0.164 >10% Constant
d RLTIR 0.227 >10% Constant
d VACRATIO 0.350 >10% Constant
d OILPRICE 0.062 >10% Constant
Notes: Truncation lag = 3. The critical values shown for
the test statistic are based on the response surfaces esti-
mated by Sephton (1995), which are more accurate for small
samples than the values given in the original KPSS article.
When the test statistic lies between the 10% and 1% crit-
ical values, p-values, obtained by linear interpolation, are
provided.
26Table 7: Johansen cointegration tests for models 1 and 2
H0 H1 95% cv 90% cv Trace (Model 1) Trace (Model 2)
r = 0 r = 1 / r >= 1 48.880 45.700 76.239 86.560
r <= 1 r = 2 / r >= 2 31.540 28.780 21.611 21.669
r <= 2 r = 3 / r >= 3 17.860 15.750 10.572 5.712
r <= 3 r = 4 8.070 6.500 2.160 1.055
Notes: The underlying VAR models are of order 5 and contain unrestricted in-
tercept coeﬃcients. The statistics refer to Johansen’s log-likelihood-based trace
statistics and are computed using observations for the period 1991Q1 to 2008Q4.
The asymptotic critical values are those provides by Pesaran et al (2000).
Table 8: Johansen cointegration test for model 3
H0 H1 95% cv 90% cv Trace
r = 0 r = 1 / r >= 1 58.630 45.700 98.680
r <= 1 r = 2 / r >= 2 38.930 35.880 26.381
r <= 2 r = 3 / r >= 3 23.320 20.750 8.3972
r <= 3 r = 4 11.470 9.530 2.2362
Notes: The underlying VAR model is of order 5 and
contains an unrestricted intercept, with the oil price
treated as an exogenous I(1) variable. The statistics
refer to Johansen’s log-likelihood-based trace statis-
tics and are computed using observations for the pe-
riod 1991Q1 to 2008Q4. The asymptotic critical val-
ues are those provided by Pesaran et al (2000).
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